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OF
THE NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS' ASSOCIATION
[This section of the journal has been added for the exclusive use of the National District Attorneys' Associ-
ation. The selection and editing of the material contained herein is the sole responsibility of the Association's
representative, Mr. Duane R. Nedrud, a former prosecuting attorney, aid a member of the Association. How-
ever, neither Mr. Nedrud, the Association, nor the journal assumes any responsibility for the views expressed
by the authors of articles appearing in this section.]
Editor: Duane R. Nedrud, Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri
PETITION FOR REHEARING
MAPP v. OHIO
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961), no
one will question that its effect is far reaching. This is true not only for some twenty-six states that
had not adopted any form of the "exclusionary rule" but also for other states whose pre-existing
exclusionary doctrines may not measure up to the standards which are or may be placed upon the
states by the Supreme Court.
Taking into consideration that which was not brought out in any of the Supreme Court's opinions
(much of which cannot be published), as well as that which was brought out in justice Frankfurters
dissenting opinion, it is obvious that the Supreme Court majority was looking for a case in order to
impress the "exclusionary rule" upon the states. Mapp ". Ohio will go down in history as the case
chosen fc- that purpose.
Newspapers may report on such parts of the Petition for Rehearing in the Mapp Case as they
believe to be newsworthy. To one interested in reading the newspapers and even the Supreme Court's
decision, not all the facts will be known to his satisfaction. It therefore seems proper to publish the
entire Petition for Rehearing in Mapp r. Ohio, in order to present the side of the prosecutor, who was'
caught in the middle, as well as to give the illuminating historical background of the "exclusionary
rule." We thus present the Petition in its entirety.-EDrroR.
The appellee, the State of Ohio, respectfully
petitions this Court for a rehearing in the above
entitled case upon the following grounds and for
the following reasons:
I.
The judgment, imposing for the first time the
Weeks federal exclusionary rule upon the States,
is a judgment that has been rendered without af-
fording the appellee a fair and an adequate oppor-
tunity to be heard.
just as this Court took the necessary time to
search the decisions of the Court on federal process
and federal procedure to discover if they present
any analogies to support the judgment in the case
at bar, so also the appellee should be given a like
opportunity and a further hearing on the decisions
of this Court construing the'due process clause of
the 14th Amendment.
The judgment calls for an extended argument
on the decisions which have expounded the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment in harmony
with the essential reserved power of the States in
enforcing their criminal laws. The opportunity to
be heard is an essential requisite of due process of
law in judicial proceedings. This due process of law
should work both ways. It cannot be fairly said
that the appellee was accorded due process of law
in this Court, in the sense that an adequate oppor-
tunity was given to the appellee to present every
available argument before the far-reaching judg-
ment was entered.
There was no -argument advanced by the appel-
lant in their brief or orally, promulgating the
Weeks exclusionary rule in this State criminal case.
Indeed, there was no argument by the appellant
establishing that the Wolf doctrine was unsound.
-Nor did the Civil Liberties Union give any argu-
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ment in their brief or in the fifteen minutes allotted
to them on the oral hearing, establishing that a
construction of the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment rendered the Wolf decision unsound.
In fact, the judgment in this case amounts to a
summary reversal of the Court's judgment in the
Wolf case, without drgument.
Under all of the circumstances, it may be said
that the appellee was misled into a limitcd argu-
ment and briefing upon the issue upon which the
Court has reversed. The Court in no way indicated
from the bench that it disapproved of its judgment
in Wolf. How was the appellee to know that the
Court did not mean what it said, when it stated in
Wolf: "The issue is closed."
Since the judgment raises a grave issue as to
whether the States intended by the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment, to give to Federal
authority the power of prescribing what evidence
is admissible or not admissible in trials for offenses
against the States, we respectfully claim that a re-
hearing should be granted the appellee.
I".
No one questions the authority of this Court to
rule that the 4th Amendment to the Constitution
compels the exclusion in Federal tribunals of evi-
dence obtained unlawfully. Nor do we dispute the
fact that this Court, in the exercise of its super-
visory power over the Federal courts and federal
procedure, has authority to formulate rules of evi-
dence governing federal trials, as established in the
Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne and Byars cases, dis-
cussed by the Court in its opinion in the instant
case. And in the McNabb case, the court was exer-
cising its supervisory power.
But none of the foregoing cases involved an inter-
pretation of State criminal procedure. They would,
therefore, have no application to the present judg-
ment. Nor do the foregoing federal cases have any
bearing upon whether or not the States intended
by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment
to relinquish their inherent, reserved power over
State criminal process to Federal authority, on
matters such as the admissibility of evidence dis-
covered in a search.
The function oi the due process clause of the
14th Amendment ib negative, not affirmative, and
it carries no mandate for particular measures of
reform by Federal authority, of criminal jurispru-
dtnce developed by a sovereign state. In fact, this
Couri -'id in Bu . Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 647--
649, 92 L.Ed. 986, 991-992 (1948), in the opinion
by Mr. Justice Burton, on the effect of the Four-
teenth Amendment:
"The Fourteenth Amendment * ** does not sav
that no state shall deprive any person of liberty
without following the federal process of law as
prescribed for the federal courts in comparable
federal cases. * * * This due process is not an
equivalent for the process of the federal courts
or for the process of any particular state."
And again, in the Bute case, the Court stated, at
pages 655-657, 333 U.S.:
"There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment
specifically stating that the long recognized and
then existing power of the states over the pro-
cedure of their own courts in criminal cases was
to be prohibited or even. limited. Unlike the Bill
of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment made no
mention of any requirement of grand jury pre-
sentments or indictments as a preliminary step
in certain criminal prosecutions; any universal
prohibition against the accused being com-
pelled, in a criminal case, to be a witness against
himself; any jurisdictional requirement of juries
in all criminal trials; any guaranty to the ac-
cused that he have a right to the assistance of
counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecu-
tions; or any need to observe the rules of the
common law in the re-examination of all facts
tried by a jury."
The legal import of the words "due process" in
the 14th Amendment is State due process, not
Federal due process. It is not open to question
that it is within the established power of a State
to prescribe the evidence which is to be received in
the courts of its own government. Adams v. New
York, 192 U.S. 585, 594-596, 48 L.Ed. 575, 24
S.Ct. 372 (1904); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S.
545, 98 L.Ed. 281, 74 S.Ct. 280 (1954). The Adams
case distinguishes the Boyd case, cited by this
Court in support of its holding in the case at bar.
Further, this Court unequivocally stated in the
Bule case, at pages 649-651, 333 U.S.:
"One of the major contributions to the science
of government that was made by the Constitu-
tion of the United States was its division of
powers between the states and the Federal
Government. The compromise between the state
rights and those of a central government was
fully considered in securing the ratification, of
the Constitution in 1787 and 1788. It was em-
phasized in the Bill of Rights ratified in 1791.
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In the ten Amendments constituting such Bill,
additional restrictions were placed upon the
Federal Government and particularly upon pro-
cedure in the federal courts. None were placcd upon
the states. On the contrary, the reserved powers
of the states and of the people were emphasized
in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. * * *
1-hile there have been modifications made by
the states, the Congress and the courts in some
of the relations between the Federal Govern-
ment and the people, there has been no change
that has takeni from the states their underlying con-
trol over their local police powers and state court
procedures. They retained this control from the
beginning and, in some states, local control of
these matters long antedated the Constitution.
The states and the people still are the repositories
of the 'powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States * * *' The underlying control over the pro-
cedure in any state court, dealing with distinctly
local offenses such as these here involved, conse-
quently remains in the state."
Since the power of the States to prescribe what
evidence shall be received in the courts of the State
derives its force, not from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, nor from the Fourth or Fifth Amendment,
but from power originally belonging to the States
and reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment,
there can be no doubt that the judgment of this
Court in the instant case is without constitutional
basis. ,
In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 105-108,
53 L.Ed. 97, 109 (1908), the Court stated:
"* * *in our peculiar dual form of government,
nothing is more fundamental than the full power
of the state to order its own affairs and govern
its own people, except so far as the Federal Con-
stitution, expressly or by fair implication, has
withdrawn that power. The power of the people
of the states to make and alter their laws at
pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and
justice, this court has said in Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516, 527, 28 L.Ed. 232, 235,
4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 292. We are not invested
with the jurisdiction to pass upon the expedi-
ency, wisdom, or justice of the laws of the states
as declared by their courts, but only to -leter-
mine their conformity with the Federal Consti-
tution and the paramoint laws enacted pursu-
ant to it. Under the guise of interpreting the
Constitution, we must take care that we do not
import into the discussion our own personal
views of what would he wise, just, and fitting
rules of government to he adopted by a free
people, and confound them with constitutional
limitations. The question before us is the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision which forbids
the states to deny to any person due process of
law. In the decision of this question we have the
authority to take into account only those funda-
mental rights which are expressed in that pro-
vision; * * *"
As said in the foregoing case, the power of the
people of the states to make and alter their laws at
pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and
justice. When the citizens of Ohio decide that it is
best for the courts of their State to exclude evi-
dence obtained without a search warrant, theirs is
the responsibility to make the change. A sounder
theory of self-government could not be advanced.
III.
It is said by the Court that the Fourth Amend-
ment secures a right of privacy as implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and that the exclusion-
ary rule, as an essential ingredient of that right, is
therefore enforceable against the States under the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
The "right of privacy" or the "right to privacy"
(the Court uses the two phrases interchangeably)
connotes a lawful use of that right. It cannot be
supposed that the Constitution intended to guar-
antee the unlawful use of any right, whether it be
the right of privacy, the right of free speech or the
right to enter into a contract. The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a
panic. Nor could it be supposed that the use of the
right to enter into a contract for the purpose of
committing a larceny by trick is protected by the
Constitution. The character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done. How
then can it be logically concluded that the Fourth
Amendment secures the use of the right of privacy
for the purpose of committing a crime, which is
the net result of the judgment in the instant case?
We do not find the right of privacy as one of the
rights enumerated or guaranteed to an accused in
a criminal prosecution, under the Sixth Amehd-
ment. Further, it is by the unlawful use of the
right of privacy that many crimes are committed.
You don't find narcotic peddlers, for example,
operating out in the open for all the world to see.
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You don't find rapists. racketeer., gangsters and
other criminals operating in the open and in the
face of the world. Crimes. for the most part, want
discovery. Crimes, for the most part, are commit-
ted in secret with the aid of the unlawful use of the
right of privacy.
Logic dictates that any right guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be used to commit unlawful
acts. Since crime wants discovery, there is no rea-
son to castigate police officers because they dis-
cover criminal evidence without a search warrant.
This Court said in United States v. .Mitchell, 322
U.S. 65 (April, 1944):
-2. The power of this Court to establish rules
governing the admissibility of evidence in the
federal courts is not to be used to discipline law
enforcement officers."
The police, from a local level of law enforcement
experience in this county, knew with whom they
were dealing in this case. Further, the sole function
of a search warrant is to protect the police officer
against a suit for trespass or against an action in
tort. Obviously it does not serve the purpose of
protecting the criminal, nor does the absence of a
search warrant function as a defense to, or a con-
donation of, the crime. Nor does the Fourth
Amendment contain any limitation or prohibition
against the use of evidence of a crime on the trial
of a charge of crime, whether the trial is in the
State courts or in the Federal courts. The first
federal case to adopt the exclusionary rule is based
upon unfounded judicial reasoning.
IV.
As justification for imposing the Weeks eviden-
tiary rule upon the States, the Court says that the
factual grounds upon which its decision in Wolf
was based have since changed, since more States
now follow the Weeks rule. The Court cites the
California case of People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434.
The State of California did that on their own initia-
tive and within their reserved powers so to do.
The point is, that just as in the Cahan case, the
sovereign states are constitutionally free to adopt
or reject the rule, because there is nothing in the
14th Amendment delegating the power to Federal
authority to decide that for the States. If a State
questions the soundness of the exclusionary rule,
that is the prerogative of the State. Whether it is
constitutionally sound is debatable, for, as said by
Justice McKenna in Brown v. Elliott. 225 U.S. 399.
5,,) L.ld. 1136. 1140:
"The Constitution of the United States is not
intended as a facility for crime. It is intended to
prevent oppression; and its letter and spirit are
satisfied if, where a criminal purpose is executed.
the criminal purpose be punished."
In order to impose the exclusionary rule upon
the States, the rule must be invoked as a constitu-
tional mandate. In what respect has the 14th
Amendment changed since it was held in Wolf that
the evidence illegally obtained is not required by
the Constitution to be excluded by the State
courts? The Court emphasized its judgment in
Wolf, in 1954 in Irrine v. California. 347 U.S. 128,
134 (1954), wherein Mr. Justice Jackson said in
the main opinion:
"We think that the Wolf decision should not be
overruled for the reasons so persuasively stated
therein."
It is said by the Court that "time has set its
face" against Justice Cardozo'5 decision in People
v. Defore. In what respect? In the Defore case,
Justice Cardozo gave some clear-cut, sensible rea-
sons why a State chooses not to follow the exclu-
sionary rule. Further, the problems of the States in
coping with crime have, if anything, increased
since that decision. Recently, the FBI released a
report which reveals that although the population
in this country has increased 18 per cent since 1950,
the crime rate has increased 98 per cent. Murder,
rape, or assault to kill occurs every three minutes.
A burglary is perpetrated every thirty-nine sec-
onds. Robberies and burglaries in 1960 were 18 per-
cent higher than in 1959.
In the main opinion in the instant case, the
Court quotes from the Elkins case in which the
Court noted that the federal courts themselves
have operated under the exclusionary rule of
Weeks for almost half a century; yet it has not
been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffec-
tive, or that the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts has thereby been disrupted.
However, it is significant to note that the fore-
going F.B.I. statistics deal primarily with crimes
against the States. The frequency of their occur-
rence against the States establishes that local
police investigations, police procedure and subse-
quent prosecutions are of necessity far different
from federal investigations and prosecutions, and
no proper comparison can be made.
The Court cites its decisions in Elkins, Jones and
Roi as vitiating the force of the reaoning in Peoph
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-. Dtfore. In thote cases, not only was the court
exercising its supervisory power over the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in the federal courts,
lut in the majority opinion in Elkins, 4 L.Ed.2d
1669, 1680, the Court stated:
"The question with which we deal today affects
not at all the freedom of the states to develop
and apply their own sanctions in their own way."
V.
The Court reasons that State due process re-
quires that physical evidence of a crime obtained
unlawfully be excluded from a State criminal trial
because of a right of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, and for the same reason that coerced
testimony or a coerced confession is properly ex-
cluded under the Fifth Amendment; that these two
Amendments enjoy an "intimate relation" in their
perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil
liberty (secured) * * * only after years of struggle"
and together assure that no man is to be convicted
on unconstitutional evidence.
By a curious admixture of the privilege against
self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment and a
so-called right of privacy in the possession of evi-
dence of a crime under the Fourth Amendment,
the Constitution is being interpreted as protecting
against the discovery of physical evidence of the
commission of a crime because of the methods used
in making the discovery.
Possession itself of the real or physical evidence
taken in the search in this case, constituted the
crime. And this is true whether or not there was a
search warrant and whether or not the police met
with resistance in the search. When real, physical
or tangible evidence is offered to connect a de-
fendant with a crime, the possession of which con-
stitutes the crime, there is not the same reason for
excluding the evidence as applies to prevent coerced
or involuntary confessions, the truth of which
might be doubtful because of the manner in which
they are obtained.
The physical evidence does not vary by reason
of the circumstances under which it is obtained,
that is, whether it is discovered and seized with or
without a search warrant. And the defendant in
this case was not compelled to do or to say any-
thing, or to make any admissions concerninl the
physical evidence. The evidence was discovered.
She was not coerced into producing it, in the sense
that the privilege against self-incrimination is
understood. Further, the physical evidence spoke
for itself on the trial. It is true that the evidence
confiscated in this case had incriminating eviden-
tial significance, but the method by which it was
obtained by the police did not give the evidence its
incriminating character.
To read into either or both of these Amendments,
a right to security in the unlawful possession of
evidence of a crime is to interpret the Constitution
as aiding and abetting criminal activity. The right
of privacy is guaranteed to law abiding citizens,
not to those who useit as a protective shield for
the commission of crime.
The general object of the search and seizure
clause is to protect the right of privacy as exercised
by law abiding citizens, and to whatever degree
and in whatever connection the right of privacy is
unlawfully used for criminal activity, to that ex-
tent the protection of the Constitution should not
apply. And, we submit, possession of evidence of a
crime, especially where possession itself is the
crime, no matter where the possession is had,
whether on the person, in the house, among the
papers or the effects of an individual, is not a law-
ful exercise of the right of privacy.
Furthermore, there was no coerced confession or
coerced testimony in the instant case. The plain
and unambiguous language of the Fifth Amend-
ment shows that it accords a privilege against self-
incrimination "as a witness." In the case at bar,
the defendant voluntarily took the stand and
testified and thereby waived any privilege against
self-incrimination as a witness. That the protection
against self-incrimination is not secured b,. any
part of the Federal Constitution in the courts of
the States was only recently emphasized by this
Court in Cohen v. Hurlev, 81 Sup. Ct. Re-P. 954,
6 L.Ed.2d 156, 164-165 (April 24, 1961), :;1 which
case the Court stated:
- ***it is suggested that the Fcu, teenth
Amendment gave petitioner a federal constitu-
tional right not to be required to incriminate
himself in the state proceedings. * * * That
proposition, however, was explicitly rejected by
this Court, upon the fullest consideration, more
than fifty years ago, Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78; and such has been the position of
the Court ever since. See Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 323-324; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46; Knapp v. Schweitzer. 357 U.S. 371, 374.
* * * These decisions do establish, at the very
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least, that to make out a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, something substantially
more must be shown than that the state pro-
cedures involved have a tendency to discourage
the withholding of self-incriminatory testi-
mony."
We cannot have unbridled individual liberties
and at the same time have a safe, stable society.
The Court says, "Our decision, * * * gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitu-
tion guarantees him, to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is en-
titled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice."
But the effect of the decision is: The Court has
unconstitutionally taken from the State of Ohio
and all of the States affected by the judgment,
their reserved, inherent power over local police
powers and state court procedures in matters of
evidence in State criminal trials.
We cannot have "domestic tranquillity" and
"promote the general welfare," as prescribed in the
Preamble to the Constitution, when all the concern
is upon "individual civil liberties." Individual
rights and liberties cannot exist in a vacuum.
Alongside of them, we must have a stable society,
a safe society; otherwise there will be no medium
in which to exercise such rights and liberties. To
have "rights" without safety of life, limb, and
property is a meaningless thing. Individual civil
liberties, considered apart from their relationship
to public safety and security are like labels on
empty bottles.
The Court infers that police officers are asking
for something to which they are not entitled when
they come upon evidence of a crime without a
search warrant. The inference is in the Court's de-
cision also that the police are not entitled to any
short-cut methods in ferreting out crime.
Crime flourishes in great volume in these our
times and the modern methods available to crimi-
nais to execute their criminal purposes require fast
and prompt action by law enforcement officers.
The trafficking in narcotics that goes on, for exam-
ple, calls for "on the spot" action by the police. If
police officers took the time to protect themselves
with a search warrant, and that is the sole function
of a search warrant, narcotic criminal evidence
could and does very easily elude seizure. Under the
statutes of the State of Ohio, Revised Code Section
3719.22 expressly gives power to any one em-
powered to enforce the narcotic laws, to enter and
search any room, rooms, or other place wherein a
violation of the narcotic laws is believed to exist;
and further provides that any one so empowered,
may arrest without a warrant.
The securing of a search warrant presupposes
knowledge on the part of the police that a crime is
being committed. The fact that they have no prior
knowledge concerning the crime and discover crimi-
nal evidence without a search warrant, or meet up
with resistance in the search, does not import
conscious illegality in their actions. They are but
performing their duties on behalf of the rights of
the public and the required protection demanded
of them by the public.
W,,e submit that the decision of the Court in the
instant case lies outside its constitutional sphere
of authority, for the judgment places the criminal
jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control
of another. Under the circumstances, the appellee
respectfully requests a rehearing to present every
available argument on that issue. Other States
which are affected by the decision did not even
have an opportunity to be heard, and the appellee
has an obligation not only on behalf of the State
of Ohio, but also on behalf of those States in similar
circumstarces.
The undersigned hereby certify that the fore-
going Petition for Rehearing is presented in good
faith and not for delay.
Respectfully submitted,
JoHN T. CORRIGAN,
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